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Abstract
The paper proposes a model that explains cross-country growth divergences over time
for different aspects of structural change. The model formalises the links between produc-
tion technology, firm organisation (functional composition of employment) on the supply
side and the endogenous evolution of income distribution and consumption patterns on the
demand side. Wage distribution is the main channel between the organisation of firms and
consumption patterns, and firm selection is the main trigger of investment in new capital,
productivity gains and cumulative growth. The model is able to reproduce empirical stylised
facts on growth and income inequality associated with different stages of growth. We use
VARs to estimate the causal relations between the three aspects of structural change. We
then analyse the effect of the parameters that define the structure of an economy – and the
way in which this unfolds through time – on growth and income distribution via numerical
simulation. Product variety, differences in consumption preferences, organisational complex-
ity and production technology determine whether the economy experiences a take-off or a
stagnating growth, and the associated distribution of income.
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1 Introduction
World economies have experienced dramatic cross-country growth divergencies over the
past two centuries (Maddison, 2003; Hulten, 2009). Since the seminal work of Solow (1957),
growth accounting exercises have shown that production factors alone can explain only
part of these growth patterns and of the within-country variation in inequality associated
with different growth stages (Denison, 1967, 1979; Maddison, 1987; Barro, 1991; Durlauf
and Quah, 1998).
We argue that many of the candidate explanatory factors of diverging long-term growth
patterns are related to the initial conditions that define the structure of an economy and
the way in which this unfolds through time. We define structural change as in Matsuyama
(2008): “[...] complementary changes in various aspects of the economy, such as the sector
compositions of output and employment, the organization of industry, the financial system,
income and wealth distribution, demography, political institutions, and even the society’s
value system” [p 1].1 We focus on three particular aspects of the economy: production
technology, the organisation of production and the composition of output. Indeed, changes
in these aspects of the economy have a dramatic impact on output growth.
For instance, Hulten (1992) finds that an important part of the change in Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) that followed the growth of the manufacturing industry 1949-1983 in
the US is determined by embodied technological change (“investment-specific technological
change”). Greenwood et al. (1997) calibrate a general equilibrium capital vintage model
and show that “investment-specific technological change” explains most of the growth in
labour productivity. And Cummins and Violante (2002) find that the speed of technical
change in equipment and software capital goods explains “20% of growth in the United
States in the postwar period and about 30% of growth in the 1990s”. On the second
aspect, von Tunzelmann (1995) explains the economic growth that followed the industrial
revolution in Britain, the US and Japan on the basis of the changes in the organisation
of production. While Desmet and Parente (2009) show how growth in firm size that
followed the industrial revolution in England and the US.2 On the third aspect, Funke
and Ruhwedel (2001); Economic Commission for Europe (2004) show that countries with a
higher level of per capita income are characterised by a larger variety of available goods (or
a larger number of markets, as expressed by Desmet and Parente (2009)) and have a more
complex production/export structure (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). While Falkinger
and Zweimu¨ller (1996) and Falkinger and Zweimu¨ller (1997) show that product variety is
positively related to income and to the equality of its distribution.
In this paper we model these three aspects of structural change and their interactions,
where exogenous parameters define the structure of an economy and the way in which this
unfolds through time. The model has two types of firms: capital and final good producers.
Both types of firm have a hierarchical structure of workers and managers, forming classes
of consumers with different preferences. Production technology is captured by the speed
1Emphasis by the authors.
2According to Sokoloff (1984), such a transformation is not found only in mechanised industries.
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at which capital good firms increase the productivity of new capital vintages and sell
them to final good firms. The organisation of production is modelled as the number of
tiers of executives necessary to manage a firm (and therefore its size) and the difference
in earnings among organisational tiers. Finally, the initial variance of the distribution of
products’ quality and price measures the composition of production, and the variance of
the preferences of different earning classes measures the composition of demand.
In the model, the interaction between the three aspects of structural change works
as follows: for a given rate of investment, the larger is the increase in the productivity
of capital vintages which are incorporated in the production process of final good firms,
the higher is the growth of firm productivity. An increase in firm productivity leads to
an increase in the relative demand for its good (via a price reduction). The increase
in firm sales is followed by organisational changes toward larger production units and a
higher number of management levels, and higher investment.3 The increase in the number
of organisational layers induces the formation of new consumption classes with different
preferences for the goods’ quality and price. For large earnings disparities this also leads
to a higher purchasing power of the new classes and higher inequality.
We analyse the parameters that control the three aspects of structural change using nu-
merical simulations. The remaining parameters are initialised with reference to empirical
evidence.
The main findings identify a number of stylised facts that characterise (and explain)
patterns of growth at different stages of the development cycle, from initial industrialisa-
tion to post-industrial stagnation: (i) Output growth is lessened by a high initial variety
of products and demand; (ii) A larger increase in organisational complexity (firm size
and number of organisational layers) coupled with faster technological change in capital
goods leads to higher productivity and output growth despite being conducive of earning
disparities and higher income inequality;4 (iii) At the same time, large earning dispari-
ties, coupled with intermediate levels of organisational complexity, lead to large income
inequality and to lower output growth.
A number of models study the relation between changes in some aspect of the economy
and income growth. Models in the post-Keynesian tradition focus on the changes that
take place at the sectoral level (e.g. Pasinetti, 1981; Sirquin, 1988; Cornwall and Cornwall,
1994; Kurz and Salvadori, 1998; Cesaratto et al., 2003). A second group of models focus
on product innovation taking place in a final good sector as a function of changes in the
structure of demand, where preferences change with income (Aoki and Yoshikawa, 2002;
Fo¨llmi and Zweimu¨ller, 2008; Matsuyama, 2002). Some of these contributions analyse the
relation between income distribution and growth based on the change in demand for differ-
3We are aware of the relevance of less hierarchical forms of organisation, such as market-based vertical
relations and intermediate forms, extensively studied in the economic geography literature on clusters,
districts, industrial poles and so on. However, in 2005 97.6% of US firms with less than 100 employees
accounted for 38% of the total employment (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2005).
4Although the latter result may be counterintuitive with respect to industrialised countries, there is a
large body of literature showing an increase in inequality during the first phase of transition from low to
middle income.
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entiated goods. Models in the evolutionary tradition (Nelson and Winter, 1982) focus on
process innovation: some contributions model technical change as ‘quasi-vintages’ (Silver-
berg and Verspagen, 1994b,a); others consider disembodied technical change and variation
in labour productivity (Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993; Dosi et al., 1994b), representing a
two-sector economy – capital goods and consumer goods. More recently, Saviotti and
Pyka (2008) propose models in which they interpret development as the creation of new
sectors: they show that a larger variety of goods leads to higher economic growth. The
unified growth theory (UGT) models explicitly study the transformation from a stagnant
agricultural economy to a rapidly growing industrial economy, typically referring to the
industrial revolution in England (Desmet and Parente, 2009; Galor, 2010; Lagerlo¨f, 2006;
Stokey, 2001; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2006). Some of these models focus on human capital
formation changes in population growth and capital investment (Galor, 2010; Voigtla¨nder
and Voth, 2006, e.g.), while others focus on the joint change of consumer goods and firm
size (Desmet and Parente, 2009). Finally, the new political economy models, (e.g. Ace-
moglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Adam and Dercon, 2009) focus
on the institutional aspects of structural change, analysing the relation between political
transition (de facto political power) and economic transition. Some of the contributions
focus on the role of institutions in determining the organisation of production Greif (2006).
Our model abstracts from institutional dynamics but shares elements with the first
four groups of models: the relation between the supply and the demand side of structural
change, the evolutionary behavioural assumptions, and the long-term analysis of the UGT,
particularly in its attempt to integrate different phases of growth. We depart form these
models and add to the literature in the following respects.
First, to our knowledge, this is the first model that attempts to link and the analyse
the interactions between technology, organisation, functional distribution of employment
and consumer behaviour. Second, we make extensive use of micro foundations to model
these interactions. To do so, we follow the recent advances in the study of macro economic
dynamics that convincingly show the relevance of including in macro models the careful
consideration of heterogeneous human agents’ behaviour (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), and
“non-routine decision making and unforeseeable changes in the social context within which
individuals make decisions” (Frydman and Goldberg, 2007, citing from Phelps’s Foreword
on page xviii). Third, our model is closely related to the recent attempts to study macro
economic policies in an agent-based framework using insights form the Schumpeterian
and Keynesian traditions (Dosi et al., 2010). In line with Dosi et al. (2010), we take a
step forward with respect to the neo-Keynesian micro foundations as well as relax the
assumption of the ability of economic agents to optimise, which is close to the works of,
among others, Arifovic et al. (1997), Deissenberg et al. (2008), Kinsella et al. (2010), and
some contributions in Dawid and Fagiolo (2008).
Our contribution can be understood as a bridge between the Schumpeterian literature,
the structuralist literature, and agent-based models that address both economic agents’
transactions and “the nature of their interactions with each other and with their environ-
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ment” (Howitt, 2006, p. 4).5 For a broader overview of agent-based models in economics,
we refer the reader to the special issues edited by Tesfatsion (2001), while recent discus-
sions on the advantages of agent-based models for the study of macro economic phenomena
can be found in Leijonhufvud (2006), Buchanan (2009), Farmer and Foley (2009), Dawid
and Neugart (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2011) and the special issue
by Dawid and Semmler (2010).
The next section 2 provides a detailed description of the model and its dynamics.
Section 3 briefly shows how the model replicates empirical stylised facts and explains
the main mechanisms behind these benchmark results. We then analyse and discuss the
impact of the parameters determining the three aspects of structural change on growth
and distribution via numerical simulations (Section 4), concluding with a brief discussion
and summary of our contribution (Section5). Appendix A provides details on the model
sensitivity to randomness.
2 The model
At first, we provide an overview of the main components of the model and its dynamics
and then describe the model in greater detail, paying particular attention to the empirical
literature supporting the mechanisms modelled.
2.1 Agents, markets and dynamics
Our economy is composed of three sectors. First, a final good sector populated by firms
indexed f ∈ {1; 2; ...F} that serve final demand. Each firm produces a single good with a
competing technology defined by quality (i2,f ∼ U [i2,f , i2,f ]) and price (i1,f (t)). Firms use
a stock of different capital goods and a labour force hierarchically structured in workers
and managers. Each manager coordinates a number of subordinate workers and managers:
the lower this number, the larger and more complex the firm’s organisation in terms of
the number of layers. Organisational structure translates into a hierarchical structure of
wages, which determines both the distribution of earnings across consumers and a firm’s
production costs (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Criscuolo, 2000; Bottazzi and Grazzi, 2007).
Second, a capital good sector populated by firms indexed g ∈ {1; 2; ...;G}. Each firm
produces a single capital good with a specific embodied level of productivity. The only
source of technological change and productivity gains in the final good sector – and in the
economy as a whole – is innovation in the capital sector, which improves the technology
and embodied productivity of capital goods. Innovation is funded by available profits and
carried out by a specific class of workers, the ‘engineers’. Capital good firms’ only input
is labour – again hierarchically structured.
Third, a household sector populated by workers/consumers pertaining to income classes
indexed z ∈ {1; 2; ...; Λ(t)}. Each class is characterised by the available income and the
5See also Colander et al. (2008) and LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008).
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preferences on the characteristics of the final good. Preferences are assumed to be lexico-
graphic. The available income reflects firms’ hierarchical organisation in tiers.
Agents interact in three non-Walrasian markets (Colander et al., 2008; Dosi et al.,
2010): in the final good market households spend part of their income to buy products
from final good firms. Supply is constrained by a firm’s production capacity and demand
depending on households’ available income. In terms of simulation steps, households first
select firms matching their lexicographic preferences with a given demand and purchase
goods from firms inventories, defining current sales. Second, final good firms align pro-
duction decisions to current demand and unsold inventories in an attempt to clear the
market: production takes place. Third, they estimate the demand for labour and new
capital investment for the following period, based on the current disequilibrium between
demand and available production capacity. Fourth and last, the difference between sales
and production defines the future level of inventories. These are used by firms to estimate
their expected demand at the next period.
In the intermediate good market final good firms acquire capital goods to expand
their production capacity. Again, in terms of simulation steps, capital good firms start
producing a new capital good only when they receive an order from final good firms. These
choose a capital good firm stochastically, following a probability function that depends
on the characteristics of the capital good (price and embodied productivity) and on the
waiting list; the time lag to build a new capital good depends on the capital good firm’s
production capacity. In turn, capital good firms estimate their labour demand based on
the current mismatch between the sum of orders and their available capacity. Finally,
depending on their profits, capital good firms might devote financial resources to the
recruiting of new engineers to innovate and produce a new capital vintage to be available
in the following period.
Third, the model represents a labour market, where the demand linearly depends on
firms’ sales. We assume no labour shortages in the long run and short-term inertia. In
this market, the level of unemployment is determined as a function of firms’ vacancies
following a Beveridge curve. Along with inflation and productivity, unemployment affects
the minimum wage.
Both the final and capital good markets are imperfectly competitive. In line with
several recent contributions (Solow, 2008; Dosi et al., 2010), we assume persistent dis-
equilibrium and no market clearing due to a non-coordinated demand of heterogeneous
consumers and adaptive incorrect expectations (Phelps, 2007) of heterogeneous firms. As
in (Dosi et al., 2010, p.1749), “the model meets Solow (2008) plea for micro-heterogeneity:
a multiplicity of agents interact without any ex-ante commitment to the reciprocal con-
sistency of their actions”. Agents therefore take their decisions on the basis of adaptive
behavioural rules and do not necessarily optimise, though they may well reach - as in (Gin-
tis, 2007) - a Walrasian equilibrium if environmental conditions are stable. However, in a
model of persistent structural change at the micro level, as defined by Matsuyama (2008),
environmental conditions are, by definition, not stable over time, and an equilibrium can
6
not be reached.6
2.2 Final Good Sector
2.2.1 Production
A final-good firm f ∈ {1; 2; ...F} produces a single product.7 Similarly to Chiarella (2000,
Ch. 2), production is planned given current expected sales Y e(t). These are a convex
combination of past expected sales Y e(t−1) and actual demand faced in t−1 (Yf (t− 1)):
Y ef (t) = a
sY ef (t− 1) + (1− a
s)Yf (t− 1) (1)
We assume a sticky adaptation in sales expectations (as) to short-term cycles. Following
Blanchard (1983) and Blinder (1982), production smoothing is realised through inventories(
s¯Y ef (t)
)
:8 production decision
(
Qdf (t)
)
is revised to adjust to changes in the expected
demand
(
Y ef (t)
)
and existing inventories (Sf (t− 1)):
Qdf (t) = max
{
(1 + s¯)Y ef (t)− Sf (t− 1); 0
}
(2)
where:9
Sf (t) = Sf (t− 1) +Qf (t)− Yf (t) (3)
Output depends on the production capacity of the firm in terms of labour L1f (t− 1) and
capital stock Kf (t− 1):
Qf (t) = min
{
Qdf (t);Af (t− 1)L
1
f (t− 1);DfKf (t− 1)
}
(4)
where Af (t− 1) is the labour productivity embodied in the capital vintages and Df is the
fixed capital intensity ratio.10 Labour productivity depends on firm’s investment in capital
while the available capital is limited by its suppliers production capacity (see below).
6Interestingly(Saviotti and Gaffard, 2008, p.115) define structural change in a way which is similar
to Matsuyama: an economy’s structure is defined in terms of its components and their interactions.
“Components are not just industrial sectors, but also entities at lower levels of aggregation, such as
particular goods or services, and other activities and institutions, such as technologies, types of knowledge,
organizational forms etc.” And they conclude, “What does it mean for a system to be in equilibrium when
its composition keeps changing due to the emergence of qualitatively different entities?”
7Goods are defined as a vector of characteristics, which satisfy a user’s needs in line with the Lancast-
erian (Gorman, 1959; Lancaster, 1966) approach to consumer theory. The rationale of this choice is made
explicit in Section 2.4.
8We assume adaptive expectations instead of rational expectations. Here we assume an inventory/sales
ratio which corresponds to the minimum of the observed values (e.g., Bassin et al., 2003; U.S. Census
Bureau, 2011) to avoid level effects that may be linked to the accumulation of inventories and to reduce
the propagation of business cycles.
9Inventories are allowed to be negative. In this case, they equate to unfulfilled demand or backlogs.
10In line with large empirical evidence, starting from the seminal work by Kaldor (1957), we assume
fixed capital intensity.
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2.2.2 Organisation
The organisation of firms is defined both in terms of the number of hierarchical tiers of
workers and managers and the wage differences across tiers (Simon, 1957; Lydall, 1959;
Waldman, 1984; Abowd et al., 1999; Prescott, 2003). For a given number of workers
L1f (t), firms hire workers to manage production. Every batch of ν second-tier workers
requires a third tier of managers L2f (t). Each batch of ν l-tier workers requires a l + 1
tier of managers Ll+1f (t). The number of workers in each tier l is then a function of L
1
f (t):
Llf (t) = ν
1−lL1f (t) and the total number of workers is:
Lf (t) =
Λf (t)∑
l=1
Llf (t) = L
1
f (t)
Λf (t)∑
l=1
ν1−l (5)
where Λf is the total number of tiers required to manage the firm f ,
11 and the number
of ‘productive’ labour in the first tier depends on production plans plus an unused labour
capacity (ul) – which insures against unexpected labour shortages:12
L1f (t) = ǫL
1
f (t− 1) + (1− ǫ)
[(
1 + ul
) min{Qdf (t);DfKf (t− 1)}
Af (t− 1)
]
(6)
The labour market is assumed to be inertial, where ǫL represents labour market rigidities,
but unconstrained.13
2.2.3 Capital and Investments
The capital stock of a firm, where Vf (t) indicates the number of capital vintages acquired,
kh,f and τh the amount of capital and date of purchase of vintage h, respectively, is
computed as:
Kf (t) =
Vf (t)∑
h=1
kh,f (1− δ)
t−τh (7)
where δ is the depreciation rate.14 The level of productivity embodied in the capital stock
is computed as the average productivity across all vintages available:
Af (t) =
Vf (t)∑
h=1
kh,f (1− δ)
t−τh
Kf (t)
ag,τh (8)
11The increase in the number of tiers is discrete. The total number of tiers Λf (t) can be approximated
by:
Λf (t) =
ln
(
L1f (t)
)
ln(ν)
+ 1
12Labour constraint on production is only determined by first tier workers and their productivity. Ex-
ecutives are required to organize production.
13We do not assume an infinitely elastic labour supply curve, as explained in Ciarli et al. (2010).
14The benchmark value of the one-period depreciation rate has been conservatively set following standard
estimates (Hulten and Wykoff, 1981; Fraumeni, 1997).
8
where ag,τh is the productivity embodied in the h vintage. Given the expected output the
desired amount of new capital (expressed in production units) is:
kef (t) = (1 + u)
Y ef (t)
Df
−Kf (t− 1) (9)
where u is the required percentage of unused stock.
If kef (t) is positive, the firm selects one of the capital producers g ∈ {1; ...;G} and
places a corresponding order kdg,f (t). The probability to select a certain capital good firm
g increases with the embodied productivity (ag,t−1) of its product, and decreases with its
price (pg,t−1) and the waiting time to deliver the new capital, relative to the average in
the capital sector. The actual delivery takes place after one or more steps, depending on
the capital supplier’s production capacity. The final good firm f has to delay any new
capital investments until the demanded capital good is delivered. Once delivered, firm f
introduces the new capital vintage into its capital stock: kh+1,f = k
d
g,f (t). The level of
investment of firm f in t is then given by:
RIf (t) = pg(t− 1)k
d
g,f (t) (10)
2.2.4 Wages, prices and profits
As mentioned earlier, the complexity of firms’ hierarchical organisation exponentially af-
fects the structure of wages (Rosen, 1982). First-tier wages are set by firms as a fixed
multiple ω of the minimum wage wm(t− 1): w
1
f (t) = ωwm(t− 1). As we move upstream
in the organisational hierarchy, the wages increase by a tier multiplier b, which determines
the skewness in the wage distribution:15
wlf (t) = b
l−1w1f (t) (11)
Firms set prices following a markup rule:16
pf (t) = (1 + µ¯)cf (t) (12)
15Income distribution is therefore a direct outcome of industrial and labour structure (Aghion et al.,
1999). We depart from the view that wage distribution strictly depends on labour skills and skill-biased
technical change (Tinbergen, 1975), taking on board the convincing evidence that wages are determined
by the composition of production at the macro level (Galbraith et al., 1999; Galbraith, 1999) and the
organisation of production at the micro level (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Prescott, 2003; Atkinson,
2007).
16This assumption is supported by empirical evidence dating back to Hall and Hitch (1939) and, more
recently, to Blinder (1991) and Hall et al. (1997). For a recent review of price-setting behaviour in the
euro area, see Fabiani et al. (2006).
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where we approximate unit variable costs as:17
cf (t) =
w1f (t− 1)
Af (t− 1)
Λf (t−1)∑
l=1
bl−1
ν1−l∑Λf (t−1)
l=1 ν
1−l
(13)
Profits equate to the difference between the value of sales and total variable costs:
πf (t) = pf (t− 1)Yf (t)−
Λ∑
l=1
wlf (t)L
l
f (t) (14)
In addition to their wages, managers are paid wage premia ψlf (t) that we interpret
as profit shares.18 These shares are paid out of the residual profits cumulated through
time when not employed for capital investment, RDf (t) =
∑t−1
τ=0 πf (τ) −
∑t−1
τ=0R
I
f (τ) −∑t−1
τ=1R
D
f (τ):
ψlf (t) =
bl−1∑Λf (t)
l=2 b
l−1
RDf (t) ∀l ∈ {2; ...; Λf (t)} (15)
2.3 Capital sector
2.3.1 Production and organisation
Capital goods are produced by firms g ∈ [1; ...;G]. Each firm produces a single vintage
τ of capital at a time. Each capital good produced by a firms g is characterised by its
embodied productivity ag,τ and price pg(t). Production plans for capital good firms K
d
g (t)
aim to meet current clients’ orders kdg,f (t)) and the remaining outstanding orders from
previous periods Ug(t− 1):
Kdg (t) =
F∑
f=1
kdg,f (t) + Ug(t− 1) (16)
Capital good firms’ only input is labour, for which we assume constant returns to scale:
Qg(t) = min
{
Kdg (t);L
1
g(t− 1)
}
(17)
We assume that the production of capital is just-in-time, with no expectation formation
or accumulation of stocks of unsold capital.19 The orders are covered following a ‘first in
first out’ rule: unfulfilled orders Ug(t− 1) are produced before current demand. Changes
17The tier–wage structure of variable costs implies diseconomies of scale in the short run in line with
evidence that labour cost is higher for large firms (Idson and Oi, 1999; Criscuolo, 2000; Bottazzi and
Grazzi, 2007). In the long run, productivity gains through the accumulation of capital vintages overcome
these diseconomies of scale, generating dynamic increasing returns.
18This assumption is justified by the empirical evidence provided in Atkinson (2007), who argues that the
exponential structure of wage-tier increase is not sufficient to explain the skewness in earnings distribution.
19The assumption of just-in-time production is corroborated by the empirical evidences provided in
Doms and Dunne (1998) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
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in the level of the unfulfilled orders depend on production capacity and demand:
Ug(t) = max
{
Kdg (t)− L
1
g(t− 1); 0
}
(18)
Capital good firms’ organisation is modelled symmetrically to the one in the final
good sector. For every batch of ν subordinates, firms hire one executive to coordinate
their work. The total number of workers can then be expressed as:
Lg(t) =
Λg(t)∑
l=1
L1g(t)ν
1−l. (19)
where ν is assumed to be equal for both sectors.
The number of productive workers L1g(t) hired depends on the level of output K
d
g (t)
and the unused labour capacity um:
L1g(t) = ǫL
1
g(t− 1) + (1− ǫ)
[(
1 + ul
)
Kdg (t)
]
(20)
where the convex combination reflects rigidities on the labour market.
2.3.2 R&D and innovation in capital vintages
As is usually the case in Schumpeterian growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Sil-
verberg and Verspagen, 2005; Dosi et al., 2010), innovation follows a stochastic process
with some probability distribution, depending on the resources invested. The productivity
embodied in the capital goods is the result of uncertain firm’s R&D activity (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). Formally, R&D investments are represented by an increase in the number
of research engineers employed by the firm LEg (t) (Llerena and Lorentz, 2004). This affects
the probability of succeeding in innovation:
Pg(t) = 1− e
−ζLEg (t−1) (21)
Firms devote a share ρ of their cumulated profits to employ new engineers. The number
of engineers to be employed should, however, not exceed a ratio νE of the firm’s productive
labour force L1g(t):
LEg (t) = min
{
νEL1g(t); ρ
(
t∑
τ=1
πg(τ)−
t−1∑
τ=1
RDg (τ)−
t−1∑
τ=1
wEg (τ)L
E
g (τ)
)}
(22)
If the R&D activity is successful, the productivity embodied in the newly developed
capital vintage is a random process that depends on the outcome of past R&D efforts, in
line with the concept of ‘local search’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982):
ag,τ = ag,τ−1 (1 +max{εg(t); 0}) (23)
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where εg(t) ∼ N(0;σ
a). The advances in the vintages’ embodied productivity are higher,
the larger the variance of the stochastic process of innovation σa.
2.3.3 Wages, prices and profits
Symmetrically to the final good sector, prices of capital goods are set according to a
markup rule µg on unit variable costs (labour), including also wages of the engineers:
pg(t) = (1 + µg)

w1g(t)
Λg(t−1)∑
l=1
bl−1
ν1−l∑Λg(t)
l=1 ν
1−l
+
wEg (t)L
E
g (t− 1)
L1g(t− 1)

 (24)
The wage structure replicates the final good firm’s structure: as we move upstream
in the hierarchy, the wage increases by a given multiplier b. We assume no hierarchy for
engineers’ wage wEg (t), who are paid as a multiple ω
E of the minimum wage wm(t− 1):
wlg(t) = ω
kwm(t− 1)b
l−1 (25)
wEg (t) = ω
Ewm(t− 1) (26)
Profits are cumulated either to be redistributed as dividends and bonuses RDg (t) =
(1− ρ)
(∑t
τ=1 πg(τ)−
∑t−1
τ=1R
D
g (τ)−
∑t−1
τ=1w
E
g (t)L
E
g (τ)
)
or to recruit new engineers (Eq
22):
πg(t) = pg(t)Qg(t)−
Λg(t)∑
l=1
ωkwm(t)L
1
g(t)
(
b
ν
)l−1
− wEg (t)L
E
g (t) (27)
The bonus distribution scheme is similar to the one for final good firms:
ψlg(t) =
bl−1∑Λg(t)
l=2 b
l−1
RDg (t) ∀l ∈ {2; ...; Λg(t)} (28)
2.4 Households
2.4.1 Income distribution
A consumer class z is defined as the class of workers in a given tier l within the firm’s
organisational structure. The income available to each class z is the sum of both wage
and profit shares paid to the corresponding worker tier:
Wz(t) =
F∑
f=1
wlf (t)L
l
f (t− 1) +
F∑
f=1
ψlf (t) +
G∑
g=1
wlg(t)L
l
g(t− 1) +
G∑
g=1
ψlg(t) (29)
Substituting in the previous equations the equation for the structure of wages (11 and
26), labour (5 and 19) and dividends (15 and 28), we obtain the following expression:
Wz(t) = wm(t−1)
(
b
ν
)z−1 ω
F∑
f=1
L1f (t− 1) + ω
k
G∑
g=1
L1g(t− 1)

+

 F∑
f=1
RDf (t)∑Λf (t)
l=2 b
l−1
+
G∑
g=1
RDg (t)∑Λg(t)
l=2 b
l−1

 bz−1
(30)
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where the minimum wage wm(t) is set at the macro–economic level (e.g. Boeri, 2009).
We assume the wage setting to be linked to three main macro-economic dynamics: (i)
labour productivity growth, to keep the pace of labour value contribution; (ii) consumer
prices, to insure a long-run stability of purchasing power; and (iii) employment level, to
keep track of labour market dynamics in the negotiations (efficiency wages, corporatism
or bargaining).The formalisation of minimum wage dynamics proposed here is equivalent
to a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2006; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005) with outward
shifts that follow increases in aggregate productivity and consumer prices. While we derive
the unemployment level from a Beveridge curve, with the rate of vacancies endogenously
determined by firms’ demand of new labour (Bo¨rsch-Supan, 1991; Nickell et al., 2002;
Yashiv, 2007).20
2.4.2 Consumption
The distribution of income across classes and consumer preferences over the good’s char-
acteristics define the demand curve and a firm’s output share. Aggregate demand is then
determined endogenously by the expenditure and income of consumption classes. Con-
sumer spending is driven by long-term consumption smoothing (Krueger and Perri, 2005):
the consumed income is a linear combination of past consumption and current income:21
Cz(t) = γCz(t− 1) + (1− γ)Wz(t) (31)
As mentioned in section 2.1, interdisciplinary evidence and theories on consumption
(Valente, 1999; Swann, 1999; Witt, 2008; Babutsidze, 2007) and satisfying behaviour
(Shafir et al., 1993; Gigerenzer, 1997), have established that consumers rank goods with
respect to their relative position rather than their absolute value using lexicographic pref-
erences. Consumers/workers classes z ∈ [0; Λ] are first divided in hz(t) ∈ [1;Hz] consumer
samples, each of which undergoes a purchase routine with symmetric random variations.
The disposable income of each of these samples is Cz(t)Hz . We then implement an algorithm
based on lexicographic preferences.22 Once the available products have been ordered ac-
cording to their perceived quality iˆ2,f,hz(t) and price iˆ1,f,hz(t), the consumer is indifferent
between products that are equivalent to the product perceived as the best in the market.23
Consumer’s preferences across classes are represented by a ‘tolerance level’ υj,z ∈ [0; 1]
that measures the maximum shortfall value of each perceived characteristic iˆj,f,hz with
20A formal representation of macro dynamics is left out of this paper for the sake of readability and can
be found in Ciarli et al. (2010).
21Savings of a consumer in period t derive from non-consumed income due to consumption smoothing
and/or the unavailability of goods satisfying consumer needs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
savings are used to smooth the effect of income reduction to fit equation 31 and are not used to fund firms’
investments. We leave the introduction of a financial market to further extensions of this model.
22The purchasing routine we adopt is borrowed from the literature on experimental psychology, imple-
menting a bounded rational algorithm featuring the properties of empirically observed behaviours (Shafir
et al., 1993; Gigerenzer, 1997; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).
23See for example Dawar and Parker (1994) and reference therein: “With neither infinite time horizons
nor the incentive to perform thorough comparative studies prior to purchase, consumers are likely to rely
on heuristics to gauge quality across competitive products” [p. 83].
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respect to the best perceived product (maxf
{
iˆj,f,hz
}
). An exceedingly high tolerance
(low υj,z) means that the consumer is indifferent between a large range of products with
respect to characteristic j, while when the tolerance tends to 0 the consumer purchases only
from the best firm for a given characteristic j ∈ {1; 2}. We assume that consumers working
in the first tier are almost indifferent toward quality
(
υ2,1 = υ
min = 0.1
)
and strictly prefer
low price goods (υ1,1 = υ
max = 0.9). As we move upwards in the tiers/consumption classes
(as z increases), the tolerance toward price differences increases, while the quality tolerance
reduces by a multiplier δυ: υ2,z+1 = (1 − δυ)υ2,z + δυυ
max and υ1,z+1 = (1 − δυ)υ1,z +
δυυ
min.24
More formally, for each consumer sample hz within each class z, the purchasing algo-
rithm is described as follows. First, consumers perceive the value iˆj,f,hz(t) for each of the
characteristics j = {1; 2}:
iˆj,f,hz(t) ∼ N (ij,f , ςij) (32)
with an observational error with variance ςij .
25 Second, consumers short-list a subset of
firms Fˆhz(t) with a good matching their preferences:
Fˆhz(t) | (1− υj,z)maxf
{
iˆj,f,hz(t)
}
> |ˆij,fˆ ,hz(t)−maxf
{
iˆj,f,hz(t)
}
| ∀f ∈ F ; ∀j = {1; 2}
(33)
Third, purchases are equally spread among the products short listed. The level of sales of
each firm for a given consumer sample hz is given by:
Yf,hz(t) =


1
Fˆhz (t)
Cz(t)
Hz
∀f ∈ Fˆhz(t)
0 ∀f /∈ Fˆhz(t)
(34)
The demand for a single firm at time t is obtained by aggregating consumption from the
samples of these individual purchases:
Yf (t) =
Λ∑
z=1
Hz∑
hz=1
1
Fˆhz(t)
Cz(t)
Hz
(35)
24See for example Zheng and Henneberry (2011): “for most of the studied food groups, the demand
of the high-income group is found to be less responsive to own price and income changes than the low-
and medium-income groups, while the demand of the low-income group is found to be more responsive to
own-price and income changes than the medium- and high-income groups.” [p. 111] With no preliminary
expectation for the engineers consumer class, we have drawn the tolerance randomly (υ0,m ∼ U (0, 1)).
Given the very low ratio of engineers with respect to the rest of the population in our model, the impact
of their consumption choice is negligible.
25There is ample evidence on consumer difficulty in assessing a product quality (Celsi and Olson, 1988;
Hoch and Ha, 1986; Rao and Monroe, 1989). Similarly with respect to prices: see or example the review
in Zeithaml (1988).
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3 Empirical validation and model dynamics
We present here a set of empirical stylised facts on growth and distribution generated by
the model initialised on the basis of the benchmark configuration summarised in Table
1.26 Building on this evidence, we then illustrate the main macro and micro economic
relations that generate these results.
3.1 Empirical stylised facts
Figure 1 displays output growth patterns endogenously emerging from the model,27 similar
to what we find in Maddison’s empirical description of the long-run growth of Western
Europe and its ‘offshoots’ (e.g. Maddison, 2003; Hulten, 2009). A long period of stable
though limited growth – which we call demand -led regime – characterises the first 1100
periods. This is followed by a take-off and further exponential growth, which we call
Kaldorian regime.28
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Figure 1: Growth rates for the economy output across time steps; data from
moving averages computed over punctual growth rates. For each time step the series reports
the average value across 100 replications together with inter-replication confidence intervals
set at 1.96 standard deviations.
With respect to income distribution, a well-known empirical fact of countries’ early
stages of growth is the inverted U-shaped relation between income growth and inequality,
26We validate the model using 100 replicates of the benchmark configuration to control for the influence
of random events.
27We plot the moving average of growth – with confidence intervals – ˆ˙Yt =
∑L
h=0 Y˙t−h
L+1
, where Y˙t is the
output growth rate at constant prices, to smooth short-term cycles.
28We come back to a detailed explanation of the two regimes in the following section.
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Parameter Description Value Data
i2 Minimum quality level 98 Analysed
i2 Maximum quality level 102 Analysed
as Adaptation of sales expectations 0.9 –a
s¯ Desired ratio of inventories 0.1 [0.11 - 0.25]b
ul Unused labor capacity 0.05 0.046c
u Unused capital capacity 0.05 0.046c
µ¯ Markup 0.2 [0-0.28]; [0.1, 0.28]; [0.1,
0.39]d
δ Capital depreciation 0.001 [0.03, 0.14]; [0.016, 0.31]e
1
D¯
Capital intensity 0.4 D = [1.36, 2.51]f
ǫ Labor market friction 0.9 0.6; [0.6, 1.5]; [0.7, 1.4];
[0.3, 1.4]g
ω Minimum wage multiplier 1.11 [1.6, 3.7]h
b Executives wage multiplier 2 Analysed
ν Tier multiplier 5 Analysed
1− γ Smoothing parameter 0.2 [.04, .14]; [.06, .19]i
ςij Error in the consumer’s evaluation
of characteristics
j = 1: 0.05;
j = 2: 0.1
–j
δς τ inter-class multiplier 0.2 [-0.8, 2.4] Mean: 0.18
k
υmin = υ2,1 Highest = first tier quality tolerance 0.1 Analysed
υmax = υ1,1 Lowest = first tier quality tolerance 0.9 Analysed
z Parameter innovation probability 10000 –l
σa Standard deviation productivity
shock
0.01 Analysed
ρ R&D investment share 0.7 –m
ωE Engineers’ wage multiplier 1.5 [1.2, 1.4]n
F Final good firms 50 –
G Capital good firms 15 –
Hz Consumer samples 50 –
aEmpirical evidence not available: the parameters has no influence on the results presented here. bU.S.
Census Bureau (2011); Bassin et al. (2003). cCoelli et al. (2002) with reference to the ‘optimal’ unused
capacity. dMarchetti (2002); De Loecker and Warzynski (2009); Joaquim Oliveira et al. (1996). eNadiri
and Prucha (1996); Fraumeni (1997) non residential equipment and structures. We use the lower limit
value, (considering one year as 10 simulation steps) to avoid growth in the first periods to be determined by
the replacement of capital. fKing and Levine (1994). gVacancy duration (days or weeks) over one month:
Davis et al. (2010); Jung and Kuhn (2011); Andrews et al. (2008); DeVaro (2005). hRatio with respect
to the average wage (not minimum) in OECD countries Boeri (2009). iKrueger and Perri (2005); Gervais
and Klein (2010). hEmpirical evidence not available to the best of our knowledge. Parameters set using
the qualitative evidence in Zeithaml (1988). kChange in price elasticity for food product categories (Zheng
and Henneberry, 2011) (inverted signs, as we use the increase in tolerance rather than the reduction in
price elasticity). lSet to a value that ensures that innovation in the capital sector occurs. mEmpirical
evidence with respect to profits not available to the best of our knowledge. oRelative to all College
Graduates and to accountants Ryoo and Rosen (1992)
Table 1: Parameters setting. Parameter’s (1) name, (2) description, (3) value, and
(4) empirical data range when its effect is not analysed in section 4
the Kuznets curve. When countries, starting from a low income level, experience output
and income growth, income inequality increases. Once they complete the transition phase
and reach a middle-income level, inequality decreases until it starts rising again when
countries reach high-income levels. Figure 2 plots the relation between the Atkinson
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inequality index and (log) output.29 As shown in the figure, our model reproduces a
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Figure 2: Atkinson inequality index vs. output (log). Sample of data in t ∈ [1100 :
1500] (around take-off).
Kuznets curve during the period of transition from low to high income when the economy
experiences take-off and, after slowing down, enters a phase of stable sustained growth.
The model reproduces other fundamental empirical regularities, the so-called Kaldor
stylised facts, with respect to the relation between output growth (∆Y ), labour pro-
ductivity growth (∆A) and capital deepening (i.e. increases in the capital-labour ratio)
(∆K/L).30
In Table 2, we estimate the Kaldor-Verdoorn (K-V) law for the whole period and
find significant evidence of the positive relation between productivity growth and output
growth.31 When we turn to the same relation for different sub-periods (Table 11 in Ap-
pendix), there is even more evidence of the presence of a Kaldorian regime that occurs
after a structural change in firm organisation and production technology, preceding the
take-off, and is based on dynamic increasing returns and sustained investment in technol-
29The Atkinson index is computed as ATt = 1−
1
∑
Z
z=1
Wz,t
Lz,t
[
1∑
Z
z=1
Lz,t
∑Z
z=1
(
Wz,t
Lz,t
)1−̺] 11−̺
where Wz,t
is the total income for consumer class z, Lz,t is the total number of workers in class z and ̺ is the measure of
inequality aversion. Provided we are not measuring an empirical level of inequality, we use an intermediate
value of ̺ = 0.5.
30“[I]nvestigations have also revealed that whilst in the course of economic progress the value of the
capital equipment per worker (measured at constant price) and the value of the annual output per worker
(also in constant price) are steadily rising [...]” (Kaldor, 1960, p. 260).
31The Kaldor-Verdoorn Law states the existence of a positive correlation between productivity growth
and output growth. This relationship, initially identified by Verdoorn (1949) and restated by Kaldor (1966),
has been discussed ever since, in both the development and empirical growth literatures. See McCombie
et al. (2002) for a survey and Knell (2004) and Lorentz (2005) for recent estimates of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
Law.
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ogy. In the early stages of (stagnating) growth, the low pace of change in organisation
and technology does not increase the production capacity to a level sufficient to generate
sustained productivity gains. We show below how this empirical fact in our model depends
on endogenous technical change generating self-reinforcing growth dynamics.32
∆Y (2000)/Y (1) R2 R2corr Obs.
(OLS) ∆A(2000)/A(1) 0.117*** 0.44 0.434 100
(0.013)
(LAD) ∆A(2000)/A(1) 0.125*** 100
(0.030)
Standard errors (computed with 500 bootstraps) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Kaldor-Verdoorn Law Overall Estimations
Finally, the model reproduces the empirical evidence on capital deepening, i.e. a
constantly increasing ratio of capital per worker for a growing output. In Table 3, we
show LAD estimates of the effect of an increase in the capital labour ratio (∆K/L) on
the output growth rate of output for the whole period. Capital deepening in our model is
∆Y (2000)/Y (1) Const. PseudoR2 Obs.
∆K/L(2000)
K/L(1) 10.67*** 2.981*** 0.299 100
(0.505) (0.529)
Standard errors (computed with 400 bootstraps) in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Capital deepening and growth. LAD estimates of the growth of K/L ratio
over the 2000 periods.
also the mechanism through which output growth affects labour productivity and explains
the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law. Indeed, growth is accelerated by increases in productivity,
which are the result of investment in new capital goods with higher embodied labour
productivity, leading to an increase of the K/L ratio.
3.2 Model dynamics
In the following, we illustrate in more detail the model dynamics that reproduce the
empirical facts discussed above and will enable us to isolate the parameters representing
the core of our analysis. We test the causal structure underlying the growth rate of macro
economic variables using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis on the fundamentals of
our model. Growth relations are estimated using LAD for three lags, where the sample is
again the 2000 period series of the benchmark configuration, averaged over 100 replicates.
In order to reduce the effect of short term cyclical behaviour we analyse ten periods growth.
32For a more detailed discussion of the cumulative causation nature of the post-take-off period generated
by our model, see Ciarli et al. (2010).
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The variables of the reduced model are (1) output Y , (2) labour productivity A, (3) the
price index P , (4) market concentration, measured with the inverse Herfindahl Index IHI
and (5) inequality AT – Atkinson index (Table 4).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables ∆Y/Y (t) ∆A/A(t) ∆P/P (t) ∆IHI/IHI(t) ∆AT/AT (t)
∆Y/Y (t− 1) 1.23*** 0.03 0.05 0.31 0.38***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.20) (0.12)
∆A/A(t− 1) 0.00 1.04*** -0.02** 1.18*** -0.44**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.31) (0.19)
∆P/P (t− 1) -0.56*** -0.03** 1.01*** -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
∆IHI/IHI(t− 1) 0.03*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.53*** -0.24***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03)
∆AT/AT (t− 1) 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 0.02 0.77***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
∆Y/Y (t− 2) -0.11 -0.01 -0.08 -0.42** -0.34***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.20) (0.12)
∆A/A(t− 2) -0.04** 0.25*** -0.01 0.54 -0.26*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.33) (0.15)
∆P/P (t− 2) 0.84*** 0.03 0.04 0.33** 0.27**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12)
∆IHI/IHI(t− 2) -0.03*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.31*** 0.09**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
∆AT/AT (t− 2) -0.00 0.00** -0.00 -0.04 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.06)
∆Y/Y (t− 3) -0.13** -0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.03
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
∆A/A(t− 3) 0.04*** -0.32*** 0.00 -1.51*** 0.41**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.31) (0.19)
∆P/P (t− 3) -0.27*** -0.00 -0.05 -0.31** -0.26***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.14) (0.10)
∆IHI/IHI(t− 3) 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 0.11* 0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03)
∆AT/AT (t− 3) -0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950
Pseudo R2 0.98 0.89 0.91 0.6 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Dynamic correlation between selected macro-level indicators (VAR)
For all 2000 periods we observe a significant momentum in growth rates: output,
productivity and prices exhibit a significant cumulative causation process, which is at
the core of the endogenous growth in our model. Output confirms the cyclical behaviour
observed in the growth figure, productivity is autocatalytic (reversing effect after three ten-
periods lags), and market concentration is strongly persistent over time. Prices are instead
affected by short run changes only. The results also confirm some expected dynamics: an
increase in market concentration (decrease in IHI) increases prices and income inequality;
price growth induces output growth after one lag, while inequality has only a marginal
effect on output, as this changes over the different phases of growth, as discussed above.
Having confirmed the main macro dynamics, table 4 also suggests some insightful
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results on the micro-macro relations in our model. First, while the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law
holds in the long and medium run (Tables 2 and 11 in the Appendix for sub-periods) and
particularly for the post-take-off period, in the short run and accounting for the overall
period, output growth has no significant effect on productivity growth. However, we
observe a direct positive significant effect, albeit small and with three lags, of productivity
growth on output growth. This lagged relation from productivity to output is relatively
straightforward to explain in our model: an increase in output occurs only after removing
factor constraints. Therefore firms first invest in new capital, which may bring an increase
in productivity, and then accommodate demand with an output increase.
The VAR results shed light also on the microeconomic causal relations which are at
the core of our analysis. In particular, we observe that three variables dominate the causal
relations, and affect different aspects of the model dynamics: aggregate productivity (A),
market concentration (IHI) and inequality (AT).
First, aggregate productivity growth first reduces concentration of production and
income and then - 2 lags after - induces a concentration in both variables. On the one
hand an increase in productivity stems from one or more firms investing in new capital
vintages with higher embedded productivity (Eq. in 2.2.3). Investing firms grow in size
(Eq. 2.2.1), which may require to hire a new tier of workers (Eq. in 2.2.2). Indeed, capital
investment increases output and size of capital firms as well (Eq. in 2.3.1). In both
cases, demand increases more than proportionally, due to the emergence of new classes of
workers/consumers, and to the higher wages of the new class of executives (Eq. in 2.2.4
and 2.3.3). The changes in firm size and compensation thus explain the lagged increase
in inequality. On the other hand an increased productivity reduces the cost (price) of the
investing firms (for a given size), attracting more demand from the first consumer classes
(the most populated) and increasing market concentration.
The second causal link then goes from market concentration to income inequality
with one lag: the large increase in demand for a few selected firms requires new tiers of
managers, which by assumption earn more than the existing workers, and receive more
bonuses from firm profits (Eq. 11, 15). The increased demand due to market concentration
than lead to further investment and increase in productivity, as already shown in Table 4.
Third, inequality has a modest effect on productivity: at first it causes productivity
to decrease, following the reduced investment in new machinery, whereas the increased
consumer heterogeneity that accompanies a raise in inequality has a modest positive effect
on productivity.
The VAR results contribute to explaining how micro heterogeneity is responsible for
the two growth regimes – the demand -led and the Kaldorian regimes – identified above.
The initial phase of demand -led growth originates from an initial investment of firms
increasing the number of workers (population), demand for final consumption, income,
firm size and further demand for labour. During this first period, investment occurs at
the rate of capital depreciation and population growth. The second stage of exponential
growth is related to market concentration and a sudden increase in capital investment
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by the few firms that start leading the market. The large capital investment of these
firms induces large jumps in aggregate productivity, which sets off a cumulative causation
process of the Kaldorian type (Kaldor, 1966): price reduction, increased profits, increase
in final demand, sustained investment in R&D and new capital vintages, with increasing
productivity embedded in the capital that sustains the exponential pattern.
In the following section we analyse how the the initial conditions that define the struc-
ture of an economy and the way in which this unfolds through time affect output growth
and income inequality. The effect of productivity (A) is captured by the parameter that
defines the speed at which capital good firms increase the productivity embodied in new
capital goods, σα (Eq. 23). The effect of market concentration is captured by the parame-
ter that defines the organisation of production, i.e., the pace at which new tiers of workers
and managers are created for a given increase in production capacity, increasing firm size
and final demand, ν (Eqs. 5 and 19). We then distinguish between direct and indirect
effect of inequality. The first one, observed in the linear relations analysed in the VAR,
is captured by the wage multiplier, b (Eqs. 11 and 26). The second effect is due to the
changes in consumption patterns following the emergence of new classes of consumers and
is captured by both the across-class differences in consumer preferences, υmin and υmax,
and the initial variety in the characteristics of the products they select, i2,f and i1,f (t).
4 Simulation results: structural differences in technology,
organisation and demand
We now turn to the analysis of the effect of exogenous structural conditions on output
growth and income distribution. In particular, we focus on the effect of the following
combinations of parameters defining the different aspects of the structure of an economy:
Composition of production and demand: variance of the distribution of a product’s
quality and price (standard deviation (sd) of i2,f ) and variance in the preferences of dif-
ferent earning classes (|υmax − υmin|) (Section 4.1). The relation between the speed of
technological change in capital vintages (σa) and in the firm organisational structure
(number of tiers for a given number of shop floor workers, ν) (Section 4.2).
The relation between the firm organisational structure (ν) and the distribution of wages
and premia (b) (Section 4.3).
For each combination of the parameters we ran 20 replicates with different random
seeds for 2000 time periods and report the average over the replicates. In Appendix A,
we show that 20 replicates are sufficient to wipe out the effect of random initialisations.
We then estimated if the result of each combination of parameters is significantly different
form the benchmark case with a bootstrapped quantile regression of the type lnY =
α+βijD1iD2j + ǫ, where the D1iD2j are all the possible two way interactions of the pair
of analysed parameters, except for the benchmark which is the reference value.
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4.1 Composition of production and demand
It is a well-established empirical finding that income growth is accompanied by changes
in the composition of production in terms of sectoral specialisation and product variety
through quality differentiation (e.g. Sirquin, 1988; Maddison, 2001; Dosi et al., 1994a;
Prebish, 1950; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Saviotti, 1996). Accordingly, product differ-
entiation is accompanied by a change in consumer preferences and consumption patterns
(Maddison, 2001), which become more heterogeneous across consumers as a result of the
increased variety of production and income classes.
Here we analyse the joint effect of the initial good’s quality differentiation across firms
and of the emerging different distributions of preferences across consumer classes. With
reference to the model, we vary the value of the standard deviation of product quality
distribution across firms
(
s.d. i2 ∼ U [i2, i2]
)
– assuming that a relatively higher quality
is related to a proportionally higher markup33 – and the difference in the tolerance level
across consumer classes
(
υmax − υmin
)
.34
Table 5 shows the level of output (log) for different combinations of sd i2 and υ
max −
υmin and whether the difference is statistically significant with respect to the benchmark
case (low product variety and high consumer heterogeneity).35 Our findings only partially
support the proposition that a higher initial variety (across both goods and consumers)
is linked to faster output growth. The table shows two main results: (i) a high initial
variety in the quality of goods induces a low growth when goods are substitutes, as in our
model; (ii) the heterogeneity between consumer preferences increases output growth only
when it is very large and its effect is not dwarfed by the counter-effect of an initially large
product variety.
These results are explained by the fact that too large a variety of products during the
initial time periods does not spark the take-off. In the initial periods, aggregate demand
is, in fact, too low to be an incentive for firms to invest in new capital. Therefore, firm
selection induced by high variety has the only effect of reducing the number of overall
vacancies, keeping demand low. With no demand effect, the cumulative process never gets
started, and although the economy experiences an endogenous growth, this is the lower,
the higher the initial market concentration. This result is confirmed by the low aggregated
labour productivity observed for a very low number of workers, in the presence of high
product heterogeneity.36
In other words, in order to induce the take off, product variety should develop over
time, once the economy has already undergone a growth in demand such that firms have
33Several industry studies support this hypothesis, e.g. Deltas et al. (2011), Corrocher and Guerzoni
(2009) and Verboven (1999).
34We use the distance between the minimum and the maximum tolerance level because the standard
deviation is endogenous to the model and depends on the growth pattern (and the generation of income
classes). The distance allows to compare the parameters’ space for high and low growth on a fixed set of
possible outcomes.
35The significance of each combination was estimated with a bootstrapped quantile regression. Results
of the regression are available from the authors.
36Figures are available from the authors.
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υmax − υmin
s.d. i2 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.15 13.43 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.45 13.46 14.00 15.06 16.24
3.15 6.34 6.30 6.32 6.33 6.31 6.34 6.30 6.38 6.83 9.80
5.15 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.74 4.75 4.85 5.83
7.16 4.71 4.71 4.70 4.71 4.71 4.71 4.72 4.72 4.75 5.05
9.16 4.69 4.69 4.68 4.69 4.69 4.70 4.69 4.69 4.71 4.84
11.17 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.69 4.77
13.17 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.66 4.67 4.67 4.72
15.17 4.63 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.65 4.66 4.70
17.18 4.61 4.62 4.62 4.62 4.63 4.64 4.63 4.63 4.66 4.69
19.18 4.63 4.60 4.61 4.63 4.62 4.63 4.63 4.64 4.67 4.71
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with respect to the benchmark computed with a
quantile regression (400 bootstraps)
Table 5: Level of output (Log) at constant prices for different values of product
quality and heterogeneity of preferences. Levels of output in the final period of
simulations for different combinations of the sd of i2 across firms and of the difference
between the minimum and the maximum tolerance level towards product characteristics –
quality and price
an incentive to invest in new technology and it has to be accompanied by an emerging
differentiation among consumers. If this is not the case, firms’ selection acts as a cap on
output growth.
The effect of supply and demand heterogeneity on income inequality is non-linear
(Table 6): the economy experiences the highest level of inequality in the presence of large
initial product heterogeneity and very low output. Inequality increases again for very
large levels of output associated with low initial variety. In both cases of high and low
output, inequality is mainly due to the income generated by profit shares (Figure 7 (b) in
Appendix B). The heterogeneity of preferences across consumer classes has very little and
hardly significant effect.
In particular, we can distinguish two opposite scenarios: a stagnant and highly unequal
economy and a virtuous, less unequal, growing economy. In the first scenario, characterised
by high initial product heterogeneity, a small population enjoys a high average income
(Figure 7 (a) in Appendix B), unequally distributed and generated through non-invested
profits. In the second scenario, marked by low initial product heterogeneity and a high
(potential) difference in preferences, a large population enjoys a relatively higher average
and more equally distributed income.
Our findings qualify the evidence mentioned above: variety exerts a positive effect on
growth only when it is generated through time – the development process, and in the
presence of evolving consumer preferences. Otherwise, an initially large product variety
might not be sufficient to generate either structural change or growth and have negative
effects on the distribution of income.
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υmax − υmin
s.d. i2 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.15 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
3.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
5.15 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
7.16 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
9.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
11.17 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
13.17 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
15.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
17.18 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
19.18 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with respect to the benchmark computed with
a quantile regression (400 bootstraps)
Table 6: Atkinson index for different values of product quality and heterogeneity
of preferences. Levels of output in the final period of simulations for different combi-
nations of the sd of i2 across firms and of the difference between the minimum and the
maximum tolerance level towards product characteristics – quality and price
4.2 Organisation and production technology
We then analyse the joint effect of production technology (σa) and organisational structure
(ν). Production technology refers to the capital structure of firms, while the organisational
structure reflects the hierarchical structure of labour.
At the firm level, a higher number of layers (low ν), ceteris paribus, increases the
number of workers and the production costs while a wider distribution of the R&D outcome
(high σa) reduces the number of workers.At the industry level, larger potential productivity
gains should result in the most efficient firm growing and dominating the market However,
the cost associated with an increase in the number of management layers imposes a trade-
off between capital investment and growth. Finally, at the macro level both parameters
should positively affect growth via effective demand. The two parameters are expected
to increase inequality as well: (i) a higher number of tiers generate a higher dispersion in
income distribution by construction; and (ii) higher productivity allows for higher profits
to benefit the higher tiers of workers.
Table 7 confirms the expectations on economic growth. It shows the Log of output
levels at constant prices after 2000 simulation steps for various values of the parameters
defining organisational structure and production technology. The table also shows whether
output is significantly different from the benchmark case for each value’s combination. An
increase in σa positively and significantly affects output, while an increase in ν – reducing
the number of layers, ceteris paribus – negatively affects output. The results clearly
demonstrate that small reductions in organisational complexity require large changes in
production technology to achieve the same level of output growth. Finally, the reduced
significance of the difference with respect to the benchmark is due to the increased volatility
in the outcome of R&D investments: large values of σa increase the variance of output
across replicates, showing that a higher output for large σa is conditional on increasing
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ν
σα 5 6 7 10 15
0.01 17.05 9.64 6.50 4.77 4.66
0.02 18.13 9.67 6.53 4.79 4.67
0.03 20.52 9.85 6.58 4.80 4.69
0.04 22.94 11.27 6.67 4.85 4.71
0.05 23.53 12.99 6.84 4.90 4.74
0.06 28.13 14.50 6.81 4.94 4.77
0.08 35.01 19.83 7.43 5.21 4.93
0.1 49.53 26.12 9.58 5.64 5.29
0.13 49.90 38.17 11.69 6.09 5.32
0.16 70.45 50.10 17.45 9.62 8.11
0.2 90.28 71.69 56.11 14.98 14.33
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1:
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with re-
spect to the benchmark computed with a quantile regres-
sion (400 bootstraps)
Table 7: Level of output (Log) at constant prices for different values of process
innovation (σα) and organisational layers (ν)
the effectiveness of R&D investment.
Table 8 presents the effect of these parameter on the average Atkinson index over 2000
simulation steps. The table also reports the significance of the differences between these
outcomes and the benchmark case (in bold). As expected, for a given σα an increase in
the tier multiplier (ν) reduces inequality, while σα increase inequality. Inequality increases
again for very high values of ν suggesting a non-linear relation between inequality and
organisational structure.
Taken together, our results show that a higher organisational complexity and faster
changes in production technology lead to higher output and wider income disparities.
This is implicit in the assumption that as an economy grows, so does corporate size and
organisation, increasing the number of executives and their relative remuneration with
respect to shop floor workers. Admittedly, this is not so different from the experience
of the industrialised world in the last few decades.37 As we make no assumption on
the saving/consumption propensity of the different classes of consumers (only on their
preferences) nor on the institutional structure that acts on the distribution of income, an
increase in corporate size also leads to an increase in demand and output, irrespective of
the class distribution.
As noted earlier (Section 3.2), growth in output and inequality are not always positively
related, and an increase in inequality has little effect on output growth, changing sign for
different phases of growth. Here we qualify these results, identifying the conditions under
which the economy reaches relatively high output, despite the relatively high inequality.
37See, e.g., the evidence in Gabaix and Landier (2008), while Bakija et al. (2010) use tax return
data to show that 60% of the top 0.1 taxpayers in the US are executives, managers or financial man-
agers/professionals.
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ν
σα 5 6 7 10 15
0.01 0.058 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.023
0.02 0.064 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.023
0.03 0.079 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.023
0.04 0.092 0.028 0.017 0.017 0.022
0.05 0.095 0.035 0.017 0.018 0.022
0.06 0.113 0.042 0.017 0.018 0.022
0.08 0.142 0.067 0.018 0.018 0.023
0.1 0.182 0.092 0.027 0.019 0.024
0.13 0.173 0.134 0.035 0.021 0.024
0.16 0.192 0.156 0.061 0.034 0.036
0.2 0.195 0.175 0.138 0.058 0.069
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1:
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with
respect to the benchmark computed with a quantile
regression (400 bootstraps)
Table 8: Atkinson index for different values of process innovation (σα) and
organisational layers ν. Atkinson index averaged across the 2000 simulation steps
4.3 Organization and wage structure
To realise a better understanding of the effect the parameters that directly determine
changes in the income distribution in our model, we focus on the joint effect of the deter-
minants of the organisation (ν) and the wage (b) structure. The two parameters have two
symmetric effects on the supply and the demand side of the economy. On the supply side,
a higher number of layers (lower ν) and/or a higher wage multiplier (higher b) directly
increase the firm’s cost. This may also result in a higher dispersion of prices across firms
over time. On the demand side, a reduction in ν and an increase in b increases aggregate
income and income disparities, and increase the heterogeneity in demand preferences and
the range of affordable products.
Table 9 shows the effect of the organisational complexity and wage dispersion on the
log of output at constant price after 2000 simulation steps. It also reports the significance
of the differences between the outcomes under each parameter combination and that of
the benchmark (in bold). On the one hand, the higher the organisational complexity, the
higher is the output growth: the increase in the number of consumers directly translates
into higher effective demand with a direct positive effect on growth. On the other hand,
the higher the wage multiplier, the lower is the output growth: assuming no direct effect
of wages on productivity, the increase in cost generated by high disparities in wages slows
down long-run growth. However, this second effect is not significant overall.
In Table 10, we observe the impact of the organisational and payment structure on in-
equality (Atkinson index averaged over 2000 simulation steps) and their significance with
respect to the benchmark case (in bold). As expected, increasing the wage multiplier me-
chanically raises the income disparities across households. The effect of the tier multiplier
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ν
b 5 6 7 10 15 20 25 50
1 17.69 10.78 6.83 5.17 4.99 4.96 4.94 4.92
1.25 17.44 9.86 6.73 4.81 4.63 4.61 4.60 4.59
1.5 17.53 9.82 6.78 4.72 4.55 4.53 4.52 4.51
1.75 17.15 9.82 6.84 4.80 4.60 4.55 4.54 4.52
2 17.18 9.85 6.91 4.92 4.65 4.59 4.57 4.54
2.25 17.25 9.90 6.97 5.04 4.73 4.63 4.60 4.56
2.5 17.09 9.94 7.02 5.16 4.81 4.66 4.62 4.58
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1:
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with respect to the
benchmark computed with a quantile regression (400 bootstraps)
Table 9: Level of output (Log) for different values of b and ν
ν
b 5 6 7 10 15 20 25 50
1 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.014 0.019 0.038
1.25 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.031
1.5 0.028 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.023
1.75 0.039 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.025
2 0.056 0.021 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.022
2.25 0.075 0.029 0.024 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.021
2.5 0.093 0.038 0.031 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.022
Benchmark case in Bold
p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1:
Standard errors of the joint difference of each cell with respect to the
benchmark computed with a quantile regression (400 bootstraps)
Table 10: Atkinson index for different values of b and ν. Average over 2000 time
steps
ν on income disparities across classes confirms the U-shaped form, which we discussed in
the previous sections. On the one hand, when the multiplier is low, the large number of
layers amplifies even small wage disparities among layers, generating higher inequality. On
the other hand, when the wage multiplier is high, a very small number of layers emerge
– due to a low output growth (Table 9) – and the high-income classes absorb the high
rate of redistributed profits, causing large inequality even in the presence of low earning
disparities.
To summarise, the conditions that induce wage disparities and large increase in the
number of layers directly increases income inequality, as one would expect. While gener-
ating inequalities, these structural conditions may also limit economic growth: although
a large number of layers sustains effective demand (despite the higher firm costs), high
wage differences between layers increase the price level in the economy (and the differ-
ence between price and minimum wage), yielding no other benefits and slowing economic
growth.
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5 Concluding remarks
A large and diverse literature has pointed to solid empirical evidence suggesting mutual
effects on the relations between structural changes in different aspects of the economy and
economic growth. We argue that the structure of production and the way in which it is
organised by firms, together with the structure of demand, are the main candidates to
explain the growth differences we observe across countries and within countries over time.
We propose a model that accounts for these three different dimensions of structural
change, generating different patterns of growth and income distribution. The relations
between the different aspects of structural change on the supply and the demand side of
the economy occur through the micro behaviour of firms and consumers.
We show that the model is able to replicate a number of stylised facts. We then analyse
the main causal relations between the different aspects of structural change and find that
productivity growth, firm size and market concentration, and the distribution of income
across income classes dominate the causal relations and affect most aspects of the model
dynamics. First, firm selection generates an oligopolistic competition in the final good
sector which is accompanied by a high growth in capital investments by the expanding
firms. Second, it is this concentration of demand and investments that produces high R&D
investments in the capital sector, leading to rapid changes in the production technology,
quickly absorbed by final good firms. Third, firm selection and market concentration result
from the variety in the composition of production in terms of cost and quality differences,
and from the heterogeneity of consumption patterns that emerges across consumer classes.
Fourth, the organisation of production – number of managerial tiers – is what generates
cost differences and price dispersion across firms, and different wage classes. The earning
structure amplifies these differences. Capital investment introduces more heterogeneity in
the model, leading to more selection and market concentration, sustaining this cumulative
causation dynamics.
For given values of the parameters that define the three aspects of the structure of
an economy and the way in which this unfolds through time, these recursive dynamics
generate the take-off and what we called the Kaldorian phase of growth. Indeed, the
concentration of production on a reduced number of firms also affects the distribution of
income.
In the last part of the paper we analyse the conditions under which these parameters
generate the take-off and find the following main results. Product variety plays a relevant
role in the economic growth of an economy only when it is generated through time and
when it is accompanied by a broad heterogeneity in consumer preferences. When product
heterogeneity is broad during the initial stages of stagnant growth, strong firm selection
before the expansion of demand level and variety hinders the cumulative feedbacks dis-
cussed above. The economic quasi-stagnation is also accompanied by a large inequality
due to the low incentive to invest and the consequent high proportion of distributed prof-
its. Stretching the argument a little further in a long-run growth perspective, an economy
28
gains from diversifying once it has built an industrial base sufficient to induce a high in-
ternal demand and investment. An initial big push toward industrial diversification is not
conducive to high growth.
Organisational structures that lead to a large number of organisational tiers, as well as
large productivity gains embodied in capital goods, lead to higher output levels, despite
generating higher income inequality, which after the take-off has a negative effect on
growth. However, the number of organisational tiers has a non linear effect on inequality,
which increases again for very flat organisations. This is again due to a condition of
stagnating economy where profits are distributed as bonuses and not invested.
Firms’ organisational and earning structures affect economic growth both via the
level of aggregate demand and income disparities. Despite increasing average wages and
prices, complex hierarchical structures sustain aggregate demand in the long run, induc-
ing demand-led cumulative causation growth. However, the increase in earning disparities
and inequality in this case limits growth, due to the high cost of (managerial) labour with
respect to the minimum wage which reduces the purchasing power of the large bulk of the
consumers, lower investments and slow productivity changes.
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A Sensitivity and stability
While an analysis of the stability against the most relevant parameters was performed in
the paper, in this appendix we briefly show results on the model’s sensitivity to different
random seeds.
Unless differently specified, the results discussed in this paper average 20 simulation
runs with different random seeds in order to control for random variability and make sure
that results do not depend on random shocks. In what follows, we show that with our
model averaging over 20 replicates is sufficient to wash away the randomness allowing to
compromise between very large computational time and sensitivity to random effects.
Figure 3 shows the results for the output growth at constant prices, obtained from 100
different replicates with different random seeds, and the averages from random samples
of different sizes. The figure shows that if we compare averages over 100, 50, 25, or
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Figure 3: Output growth at constant prices: 100 replicates and averages. The light series
represent the output growth results for 100 replicates with different random seeds (left y-axis). The
darker series represent averages from different samples of different sizes, all converging to the same
value. Finally, dots report the inter-averages standard deviation (right y-axis).
10 replicates randomly sampled, their difference is negligible. The standard deviation
between the averages converges to zero when the output growth pattern is nonexponential
and sticks to very low values even when the growth pattern becomes exponential (after
period 1,300). This suggests that when model results are evaluated from 20 replicates’
averages, they are not biased by significant random effects.
Similarly, the Atkinson inequality index (Figure 4) shows converging values for the
across runs averages and a quite small between-averages standard deviation across repli-
cates.
To show that averages over 20 replicates are sufficiently robust, we draw on the same
graph the averages of output growth and their confidence interval (CI) (Figures 5 and 6).
Confidence intervals are represented by an area with different grey scales: the larger the
number of random replicates averaged, the lighter the colour of the CI area. For example,
if the average over 10 replicates significantly differs from the average over 100 replicates,
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Figure 4: Atkinson inequality index: 100 replicates and averages. The light series rep-
resent the results for 100 replicates with different random seeds (left y-axis). The darker series
represent averages from different samples of different sizes, all converging to the same value (left
y-axis). Finally, dots report the inter-averages standard deviation (right y-axis).
one should see the confidence area of the 10 replicates average emerging below the white
CI. Otherwise, if the confidence areas of the 10 replicates’ averages are completely covered
by the lighter confidence area – of the 100 replicates average – we expect no significant
difference. When we compare the confidence area of an average of 100 independent random
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Figure 5: Output growth at constant prices: averages and confidence intervals. The
figure shows the confidence areas of the different averages (over samples of 100, 50, 25, and 10
replicates) superimposed one over the other, starting from 10 replicates’s averages. The grey scale
goes from dark grey for 10 replicates’ averages to white for the 100 replicates’ average. The figure
shows that no section of the 10 replicates’ confidence area exceeds the 100 replicates’ confidence
area.
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replicates with the confidence areas of 10 random averages from 10 independent subsamples
of replicates from the same 100 series, there is no difference in the CI of output growth
(Figure 5). None of the 10 average areas which lie below the 100 replicates confidence
area is visible. This allows us to infer that any 10 replicates’ average do not generate a
higher random variety than a 100 replicates average, and even less so if we average over
20 replicates.
When we perform the same exercise for the Atkinson inequality index, we obtain a
very similar result (Figure 6). The difference between the confidence areas is well below
one standard error. Overall, we feel confident that we can perform a robust analysis of
the model using averages over 20 different replicates, reducing by an exponential factor
the computational time needed to create averages for 100 different random seeds.
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Figure 6: Atkinson inequality index: averages and confidence intervals. The figure shows
the confidence areas of the different averages (over samples of 100, 50, 25, and 10 replicates)
superimposed one over the other, starting from 10 replicates’ averages. The grey scale goes from
dark grey for 10 relicates’ averages to white for the 100 replicates average. The figure then shows
that very small sections of the 10 replicates’ confidence area exceed the 100 runs confidence area,
amounting to a very small difference between the confidence areas of the different averages.
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∆Y (200)/Y (1) Const. Obs.
(1) ∆A(200)/A(1) 1.1905*** -0.0101*** 100
(0.1569) (0.0019)
∆Y (400)/Y (200) Const. Obs.
(2) ∆A(400)/A(200) 0.0580 0.0002 100
(0.0796) (0.0003)
∆Y (600)/Y (400) Const. Obs.
(3) ∆A(600)/A(400) -0.0149 7.5e-05 100
(0.0870) (0.0003)
∆Y (800)/Y (600) Const. Obs.
(4) ∆A(800)/A(600) -0.1711 0.0007 100
(0.1690) (0.0007)
∆Y (1000)/Y (800) Const. Obs.
(5) ∆A(1000)/A(800) 0.0112 -0.0001 100
(0.0503) (0.0003)
∆Y (1200)/Y (1000) Const. Obs.
(6) ∆A(1200)/A(1000) 0.0605 -0.0003 100
(0.0415) (0.0002)
∆Y (1400)/Y (1200) Const. Obs.
(7) ∆A(1400)/A(1200) 0.0880*** -1.4e-05 100
(0.0129) (0.0001)
∆Y (1600)/Y (1400) Const. Obs.
(8) ∆A(1600)/A(1400) 0.1603*** -0.0008*** 100
(0.0079) (7.6e-05)
∆Y (1800)/Y (1600) Const. Obs.
(9) ∆A(1800)/A(1600) 0.1675*** -0.0009*** 100
(0.0148) (0.0001)
∆Y (2000)/Y (1800) Const. Obs.
(10) ∆A(2000)/A(1800) 0.1333*** 0.0007*** 100
(0.0225) (0.0002)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Least Absolute Deviation: Estimates computed using the Barrodale-Roberts simplex algorithm.
Standard errors derived using the bootstrap procedure with 500 drawings.
Table 11: Kaldor-Verdoorn Law Sub-Period Estimations. Least Absolute Deviation
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(a) Average income (across population
and time)
(b) Total income from profit shares
Figure 7: Composition of production: initial product and preferences heterogeneity
against income and profit shares. The figure shows the changes in the level of average income
across workers and time (a) as well as in the level of total income from profit shares (b) against
different values of standard deviation of the product characteristics (x-axis) as well as against
changing values of the difference between the minimum and maximum level of consumer tolerance
toward quality shortfalls with respect to the best firm.
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